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the Soviet Union as something unprecedented: ‘‘Since the Mongol invasions of Europe in the
sixteenth century, there has never been methodical, merciless butchery on such a scale, or
approaching such a scale. And this is but the beginning. . . .We are in the presence of a crime without
a name.’’1 A few years later, at Nuremberg, because of the lack of international legislation on this very
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against the Sinti and Roma. The term ‘‘genocide’’ found entry into the language of only some of the
indictments. In fact, as is well known to genocide scholars, the term ‘‘genocide’’ had first been coined
in a scholarly publication in 1944, too late for the Nuremberg trials, and was introduced to
international law only in 1948, when the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG).2 This convention was the result of Polish jurist
Raphael Lemkin’s tireless lobbying of government representatives from around the world to make
genocide an international crime.
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Introduction
In August 1941, in a live broadcast from London, British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill described the atrocities committed by Nazi troops and police under the
German attack on the Soviet Union as something unprecedented: ‘‘Since the Mongol
invasions of Europe in the sixteenth century, there has never been methodical,
merciless butchery on such a scale, or approaching such a scale. And this is but the
beginning. . . . We are in the presence of a crime without a name.’’1 A few years later,
at Nuremberg, because of the lack of international legislation on this very crime,
Hermann Go¨ring and his cronies were not convicted of genocide against Europe’s Jews
or against the Sinti and Roma. The term ‘‘genocide’’ found entry into the language of
only some of the indictments. In fact, as is well known to genocide scholars, the term
‘‘genocide’’ had first been coined in a scholarly publication in 1944, too late for
the Nuremberg trials, and was introduced to international law only in 1948, when the
United Nations adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (UNCG).2 This convention was the result of Polish jurist
Raphael Lemkin’s tireless lobbying of government representatives from around the
world to make genocide an international crime.
Since then, the formerly nameless crime of genocide has come a long way. After a
period of stagnation during the Cold War, it has been included in the statutes of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Before the two UN ad hoc
tribunals, numerous genocide cases have been heard, resulting in an ever-growing
body of case law on the crime of genocide. In one of these cases, ICTR judges labeled
genocide the ‘‘crime of crimes,’’ a phrase often understood to mark a special status.3
Similarly, in a case concerning state responsibility before the International Court
of Justice, counsel for Bosnia and Herzegovina called genocide the ‘‘super crime.’’4
In 2004, the UN secretary-general established the office of Special Adviser on the
Prevention of Genocide; in 2006 he added an Advisory Committee on Genocide
Prevention. In academia, Lemkin’s creation of the term ‘‘genocide’’ has given rise to
the field of genocide studies, and this field is indeed thriving: there are, as of this
writing, two international associations of genocide scholars, several international
journals focusing primarily on genocide research, and a fast-growing number of related
university courses around the world.
Despite all these promising developments, genocide as a crime does not seem to
end. There is more talk about genocide and research into genocide than ever before,
and still genocide continues. Most prominently, widespread and systematic attacks on
different tribal groups in the Darfur province of Sudan have over the last two years
been discussed as yet another case of genocide. In fact, much time was spent on the
question of whether the crimes committed against parts of the Darfuri population
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indeed constitute genocide; then, in the spring of 2005, the focus shifted toward
obtaining the consent of the Sudanese government to the deployment of UN
peacekeepers.5
It is in this context that David Scheffer puts forward two interesting proposals
concerning the labeling and classification of the crime of genocide. Scheffer introduces,
first, the term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ to describe circumstances that could lead
to genocide. The idea behind this new language is to liberate governments from
‘‘the genocide factor’’—a hesitancy Scheffer believes to exist on the part of governments
to apply the label ‘‘genocide’’ to any given situation. Scheffer posits that governments
should adopt a less restrictive approach to using the term ‘‘genocide’’ and wants to
distinguish legal, political, and historical applications of the term. Second, Scheffer
develops the concept of ‘‘atrocity law,’’ pursuant to which war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide—when certain criteria are met—can all be classified
as ‘‘atrocity crimes.’’ According to Scheffer, this special category of international
crimes is needed to ‘‘accurately describe the totality of these crimes.’’6
Scheffer’s proposals are both timely and interesting. Timely because, over the past
several years, much has been written about the genocide-related jurisprudence
of the ad hoc tribunals but little light has been shed on the meaning of the genocide
label and determination for issues of intervention and prevention.7 Equally,
the description of genocide as the ‘‘crime of crimes’’ has found its way into many
writings and speeches, but little time has been spent on contemplating the
implications of such an alleged hierarchy of crimes. Scheffer’s proposals are interesting
because he does not give in to the usual reflex of genocide scholars to simply criticize
the legal definition of genocide; instead, he attempts to increase the practical
applicability of the concept of genocide to international politics. With a view to making
genocide prevention more effective, this undertaking can only be welcomed.
In what follows I will not analyze Scheffer’s proposals from a legal perspective
(i.e., comment on the notion of atrocity law and its relation to other, existing legal
categories).8 Instead, I will look at them from the perspective of genocide prevention,
arguing that Scheffer’s suggestion to use the formula ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ repeats
the mistakes decision makers and scholars have made with respect to the genocide
in Rwanda and the conflict in Darfur. Outside the research community, following
Scheffer’s advice would be counterproductive and would inadvertently keep genocide
prevention in what could be called the ‘‘G-word trap’’—that is, a misplaced focus
on a whether a conflict is genocide or not. On Scheffer’s second point, I fully endorse
the concept of atrocity law as a welcome tool to reconceptualize genocide as forming
part of a broader category of massive human-rights violations instead of being in its
own league. I will go a step further and argue that, within the context of genocide
prevention, the label ‘‘genocide’’ should be avoided altogether; using a term such as
‘‘atrocity crimes’’ would benefit attempts to prevent genocide. In conclusion, I offer
some observations on how Scheffer’s proposals affect genocide prevention on a more
general level and what implications Scheffer’s notion of atrocity law should have for
the future of genocide studies.
‘‘Precursors of Genocide’’
Scheffer’s first proposal deals with the terminology capturing the societal processes
preceding genocide—processes that genocide scholars such as Gregory H. Stanton,
as well as the UN’s Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, have
elaborated further.9 The group that is to be singled out as the victim group is classified,
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then discriminated against; its members lose their civil and political rights; they
are dehumanized by way of propaganda and stigmatization; and so on. Scheffer
reviews the practice of the Clinton administration around the Kosovo conflict in 1999
and demonstrates how the situation in Kosovo was assessed. He recalls how the
formulation ‘‘indicators of genocide’’ was used in that connection but now prefers
‘‘precursors of genocide’’ as more exact and appropriate.
The real problem of genocide prevention is to identify the circumstances under
which such situations escalate into genocide—and distinguishing these from situations
in which they do not and any external intervention could be deemed an unjustified
interference in internal affairs. Moreover, it is necessary to signal to policy makers
the importance of timely action to avoid the eventual outbreak of genocidal violence.
International politics are geared more toward crisis management than toward
prevention and early warning. The formula ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ thus addresses
a complex political issue and is not a term governments easily will adopt and use.
As a former senior official within the US State Department and former US
ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues under the Clinton administration,
Scheffer is only too aware of this. It is his hope that the proposed language of
‘‘precursors of genocide’’ can free governments from the fear of prematurely labeling a
conflict ‘‘genocide’’ and thus lead the way to effective early warnings and genocide
prevention.
The term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ seems, at first sight, a useful and accurate
description of the process leading up to a genocide. Given Scheffer’s experience with
the Clinton administration, in particular his work heading the US government’s
Atrocities Prevention Inter-Agency Working Group, one is inclined to believe that the
‘‘precursors’’ formula may also be a working tool well suited for genocide prevention in
the political context. Currently, both politicians and media often distinguish only
between ‘‘genocide’’ and ‘‘not genocide,’’ thus missing out on the basic fact that genocide
is a process that includes ‘‘before,’’ ‘‘during,’’ and ‘‘after’’—three essential, but not
always clearly distinguishable, phases. The suggested formula does not focus on
whether genocide is occurring or not, leading to a time-consuming and complex
discussion of evidence, but focuses on the phase preceding genocide.
New Language Where a Paradigm Shift Is Needed
Upon closer scrutiny, however, Scheffer’s proposal, for several reasons, falls short of
bringing progress to the field of genocide prevention. In fact, following his suggestion
would make things worse, which would be contrary to his intentions and would lock
states into the ‘‘G-word trap.’’ The proposal is based on incorrect and partly outdated
assumptions, and, above all, it retains the focus on the term ‘‘genocide’’ instead of
shifting focus away from it. In light of the most recent experiences with the Darfur
crisis, genocide prevention needs not new language but a paradigm shift.
The ‘‘G-Word’’ Has Come of Age—But It Has Also Lost Its Power
Scheffer bases his proposal on two assumptions: that states and other relevant actors
have a hesitancy to use the genocide label, and that genocide prevention would become
more effective if states altered this attitude and used that label more freely. Scheffer’s
view echoes earlier writings about the international community’s, and in particular
the US government’s, response to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. At that time
government representatives went to great lengths to avoid using the term ‘‘genocide,’’
fearing that a genocide determination would impose a legal obligation on all parties
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to the UNCG to stop that particular genocide.10 As a consequence, genocide scholars
and non-governmental organizations active in the field of genocide prevention began to
put great effort into labeling ongoing conflicts as genocides (when deemed
appropriate). The hope was that the ‘‘G-word’’ would create public attention, exert
moral pressure, and impose a legal obligation on Western governments to take action
to stop the genocidal violence.11
Times (and legal views) have changed, however. More than ten years later, facing
massive human-rights violations in Darfur, several governments and parliaments,
and, above all, the US administration, repeatedly and early on referred to the situation
as ‘‘genocide.’’12 The assumption underlying Scheffer’s proposal—that states need to
be ‘‘liberated from the genocide factor’’ to use the term ‘‘genocide’’ more often in order
to make genocide prevention effective—is no longer valid; states have in fact begun to
use the term genocide, as it no longer bears the stigma of legal obligation. The sense of
a moral obligation has also faded with the general decrease in support for sending
troops to improve human-rights situations in distant countries. The only place where
the ‘‘G-word’’ seems to retain an aura of moral superiority (for those accusing others of
genocide) is within domestic politics, as seen, for example, in the United States, where
there is an active civil society and journalists—such as Nicholas Kristof of the
New York Times—who are concerned with genocide prevention. This movement in the
United States, however, has not had a similar counterpart in Europe. States can
therefore afford a ‘‘more liberal approach’’ to the ‘‘G-word’’ without risk of becoming
engaged in an armed intervention. This new outlook on the meaning of the ‘‘G-word’’
became crystal clear in the statement made by Colin Powell, then US secretary of
state, to the US Senate announcing the results of an investigation into the crimes
committed in the Darfur region: ‘‘The evidence leads us to the conclusion, the United
States to the conclusion, that genocide has occurred and may still be occurring in
Darfur [. . .] In fact, however, no new action is dictated by this determination.’’13
In addition, the Darfur crisis has shown that the use of the ‘‘G-word’’ is not
equivalent to actual action on the ground. At the time of writing, it has been more than
two years since the US government declared the government of Sudan guilty of
genocide; in fact, it is more than three months since the UN Security Council adopted
a resolution sanctioning the deployment of about 20,000 UN forces to the Darfur
region—and still the government of Sudan pursues the same policies and rejects the
sending of UN peacekeepers. The use of the ‘‘G-word’’ in the Darfur crisis has neither
helped galvanize broad international support for action to stop the killings nor forced
the Sudanese government to halt its campaign of ethnic cleansings. There appears
to be very little evidence that using the ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ formula with respect
to the next Darfur would change the fact that the ‘‘G-word’’ has lost its power.
Using the ‘‘G-Word’’ Generates Additional Problems
Having noted that the use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ (or of any related phrases, such as
‘‘precursors of genocide’’) not only does not contribute to the prevention of genocide, but
actually gives rise to a number of additional problems. It is these problems that turn
Scheffer’s proposal from merely failing to strengthen genocide prevention to being
counterproductive. This section highlights a few examples of these implications of the
‘‘G-word.’’
As we saw above, several actors have, during the Darfur crisis, displayed a
revised—in Scheffer’s terminology, more ‘‘liberal’’—approach to the term ‘‘genocide.’’
This, however, should not create the impression that, in the future, more government
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statements and press releases will necessarily use the term. This has less to do with
uncertainty about whether the evidence meets the requirements of the UNCG than
with the inevitably political character of such a statement. While Scheffer advocates
distinguishing between legal and political uses of the term ‘‘genocide,’’ in international
political institutions such as the UN Security Council or the African Union (AU), few
will be able to appreciate the nuances of this approach—one need only think of the
state being accused of genocide, or of those traditionally keen on maintaining a
conservative reading of concepts such as sovereignty, including China, Russia, and
certain African states. In international politics, the ‘‘G-word’’ will remain a very
serious allegation to make against a foreign government—and this would likely be
equally true for any allegation that ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ are present on the
territory of a given state.14 This is something to consider, in particular, in a situation
in which those concerned with genocide prevention intend to ameliorate the situation
by sending UN peacekeepers to the country in question. Such deployment requires,
pursuant to chapter 6 of the UN Charter, consent by the relevant host state. Both
allegations of genocide and remarks pointing to ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ may render
this consent very unlikely.
The way the Darfur crisis has evolved serves as an example. It should be recalled
that the government of Sudan has, up to this point, opposed all efforts to replace the
understaffed and under-equipped AU contingents with a stronger UN force, calling
such attempts an effort to ‘‘recolonize’’ the Sudan.15 The UN Security Council’s
resolution of 31 August 2006, which outlines the replacement of the AU forces by
UN troops, does not mention either ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ or genocide—instead the
Security Council speaks of ‘‘its strong condemnation of all violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law in Darfur.’’16 This is, on the one hand,
a concession to countries such as China and Russia, who might otherwise have vetoed
this resolution; but the omission of any reference to the term ‘‘genocide’’ is also
necessary to negotiating with the government of Sudan to try to gain its acceptance of
a UN mission to Darfur. The term ‘‘genocide,’’ following the US determination, led to a
UN commission of inquiry into the same question; since the commission’s report to the
United Nations that no genocidal policy could be documented, the ‘‘G-word’’ has played
no role on the international scene.17 All players, including the US government, have
subsequently referred only a few times to ‘‘genocide.’’ This may be decried as
inaccurate, or even shameful and dishonest; but as long as a humanitarian
intervention of the kind launched in Kosovo in the spring of 1999—circumventing
the UN Security Council and leaving aside the opposition of Russia, China,
and a number of African countries—remains an option discussed only in
editorials and letters to the editor, the ‘‘G-word’’ has only a minor role to play in the
international arena.
The use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ by different actors outside the United Nations
during the Darfur conflict has brought an additional issue to the forefront.
The independent determination of genocide by the US government in September
2004 made it evident that unilateral actions—regardless of their intentions—are easy
targets for political attacks, undermining the credibility and potential effect of any
such determination.18 The UNCG lacks a standing mechanism to survey violations of
the prohibition against genocide, but art. 8 reminds member states of the option
to turn to ‘‘relevant UN organs,’’ such as the Security Council, to take action.
Nowhere does the convention envisage that a member state might establish its
own commission to examine whether genocide is occurring in another member state.19
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In this case, both the Sudanese government and the Arab League denounced the
US finding as political propaganda.20 This will inevitably also be true of any future
unilateral assertions that ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ can be found in a given country; it is
much more difficult, however, to denounce the results of international fact-finding
commissions.21 Admittedly, the government speaking of ‘‘precursors of genocide’’
would not face the same burden of proof as the state declaring that genocide has
occurred; but this is also the soft spot of using the formula ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ as a
foreign-policy tool: the regime responsible for the situation in question can even more
easily refute the allegations as unfounded and pure political spin. Scheffer’s proposal,
intended to make genocide prevention more effective by lowering the threshold for
using relevant language, would in practice, in the case of a regime like the government
of Sudan, turn out to be self-defeating.
In the Interests of Preventing Genocide: Drop the ‘‘G-Word’’
Given the original focus of the UNCG on prevention and punishment of the crime of
genocide, it is ironic that the term ‘‘genocide’’ has evolved to become a stumbling block
to genocide prevention. In the case of Darfur, much focus and energy was wasted, in
the first half of 2004, on discussing whether or not the conflict fell under the terms of
the UNCG. Politicians and the media engaged in intense debate over the ‘‘G-word,’’
while the victims of the violence continued to suffer and to wait for help.22 Scheffer’s
proposal would keep states locked in this futile debate with respect to future conflicts,
as the focus in the political reality will be not on ‘‘precursors’’—which could serve as an
important reminder of the fact that prevention can, and should, start long before the
actual mass violence is unleashed—but on ‘‘genocide.’’ It does not take much political
genius (at least, not after the endless discussions about the Darfur conflict) to predict
that future conflicts would yield similar debate over whether it is appropriate and
justified to speak of ‘‘precursors of genocide.’’
This debate is not only a waste of time when the situation demands quick, decisive
action to protect potential victims; it is also unnecessary, in light of recent
developments in the field of humanitarian intervention. According to the ‘‘Outcome
Document’’ of the UN World Summit of September 2005, which has since been
confirmed by a resolution in the UN Security Council, all states have a responsibility to
protect the civilian population of their own territory from war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide, and, in cases where the state in question fails to act
as necessary, the international community has a responsibility to do the same.23 No
distinctions are made among these different crimes. The same is true for the provisions
of the UN Charter authorizing the Security Council to mandate peacekeeping missions
and of the Charter of the African Union, which explicitly allows the AU to intervene in
other member states when there are war crimes, crimes against humanity, or
genocide.24 For this reason, when considering external intervention necessary to stop a
situation from developing into genocide, genocide scholars and the media should drop
all focus on the ‘‘G-word,’’ rather than discussing whether certain actions could be
classified as ‘‘precursors of genocide.’’
Scheffer asserts that during the Kosovo conflict the then-current formulation
‘‘indicators of genocide’’ ended the media discussion of whether or not genocide was
occurring in Kosovo. Recall, however, that this discussion became moot because NATO
decided to intervene with force—and did so without the authorization of the UN
Security Council. The question of whether genocide was in the making became, for
some time, beside the point.25 It should be recalled also that the spring of 1999
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provided a case study of how easily the term ‘‘genocide’’ can be politically
instrumentalized within Western democracies. In Germany, for example, leading
members of the government spoke of genocide with a view to build public support for
the planned NATO operations.26 Scheffer’s call for ‘‘liberating governments from the
genocide factor’’ should also be weighed carefully in light of these recent experiences.
Interim Conclusion
Scheffer’s proposal to use the formula ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ must be rejected.
This rejection is not based on what the proposal tries to achieve; clearly it has its
academic merits and is based on good intentions. It fails to convince, however, in terms
of policy making, as it does not take into account the international response to the
Darfur crisis, and therefore it cannot help to make genocide prevention more effective.
The idea of distinguishing between legal, political, and historical applications of the
‘‘G-word’’ remains academic; instead we must realize that the ‘‘G-word,’’ in many cases,
will be a non-starter for effective genocide prevention. The ‘‘G-word’’ has an important
role to play when individual perpetrators are being brought to justice, but its role is far
more minor when it comes to generating international support for peacekeeping
operations or UN-authorized humanitarian interventions. It is Scheffer’s own concept
of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’—his second proposal—that implements this insight and points the
way toward accomplishing what really is at stake. Colin Powell put it this way in his
testimony before the US Senate:
Let us not be too preoccupied with this [genocide] designation. These people are in
desperate need and we must help them. Call it civil war; call it ethnic cleansing; call it
genocide; call it ‘‘none of the above.’’ The reality is the same. There are people in Darfur
who desperately need the help of the international community.27
‘‘Atrocity Law’’
After 1994, many genocide scholars and activists viewed the failure to label the mass
killings in Rwanda as genocide as symbolic of the failure to intervene and stop the
killings. More and more emphasis was placed on using the term ‘‘genocide,’’ and failure
to do so was branded ‘‘denial.’’ In 2004, the United States and other actors did call the
Sudanese government’s campaign in Darfur genocide—and those not using the
‘‘G-word’’ were attacked as deniers.28 But even after the US determination of genocide,
nothing much has happened on the ground. The situation of the people of Darfur
remains critical.
The lesson of Rwanda and Darfur—of the way the ‘‘G-word’’ was initially dodged,
only to be used later without serious or effective follow-up—is not that another time
around, witnessing yet another atrocious conflict, even more actors should label, or
should be urged to label, a given conflict ‘‘genocide.’’ The lesson, rather, is that the
genocide label can no longer be seen as a decisive step toward action to stop mass
killings. Labeling does not do it. Instead, a fresh look is needed. What terminology
should be used, by genocide scholars and others, when there are massive human-rights
violations and a quick and effective response is needed from the international
community? It is in this context, and taking into account the lengthy discussions about
genocide and the lack of response to Darfur, that we need to assess Scheffer’s second
proposal.
Here, Scheffer suggests placing genocide within a larger category of crimes that
also includes war crimes and crimes against humanity when these fulfill certain
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conditions, which he outlines in more detail. This category of crimes Scheffer calls
‘‘atrocity crimes.’’29 Scheffer remarks that the only answer to all questions on whether
or not a given conflict constitutes genocide should be, ‘‘We don’t care!’’30 Only this
second proposal, however—the notion of atrocity law—draws this consequence of the
issues surrounding the use of the ‘‘G-word’’; Scheffer’s suggestion to speak of
‘‘precursors of genocide’’ does not. For a number of reasons, Scheffer’s ‘‘atrocity
crimes’’ constitute a welcome addition to the terminology of genocide studies.
First of all, speaking of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ may help to ensure that international
attention, be it from media or from scholars, is not overly focused on conflicts that
are being discussed as ‘‘genocide.’’ Because what is in a name? It is difficult to grasp
why the enormous war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has generated
so little interest, not to speak of response, in the mainstream media and among
non-governmental organizations in both North America and Europe. Several million
people are thought to have been killed in or because of the war in the DRC, while
the conflict in Darfur, over the last three years, has killed perhaps 400,000.
Indeed, suffering should not be measured in numbers; but neither should suffering
be measured in labels. This is as true for the DRC as for Darfur: international action
should not depend on a genocide determination.31 Scheffer’s notion of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
may help to overcome the existing focus on genocide.
Moreover, the concept of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ may help to rid discussions in political
forums of the everlasting question of genocidal intent—and thus take the discussion
away from the lawyers.32 The UNCG stipulates a very high threshold for genocide:
that the perpetrator had the intent not only to carry out the acts described in the legal
definition of genocide but to do so with a view to destroy, in whole or in part, the group
to which the victims belong. The trials before the ICTY, in particular, have shown
what great challenges this requirement of intent can pose in terms of evidence—and
there is no need to confront policy makers with this discussion when they are deciding
on the feasibility of, for example, a military intervention. International law, as it
stands, allows for UN-authorized interventions and, arguably, for unauthorized
humanitarian interventions regardless of whether genocide or ‘‘only’’ ethnic cleansing
or other crimes against humanity are being committed. To speak of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ in
this connection helps to refocus the debate on the fact that widespread and systematic
human-rights violations are being committed. Their specific legal classification can
and should be left to judges and be dealt with outside the forums where political
measures to stop the crimes are discussed and decided.33 This should also be done to
ensure that the argument for intervention is not weakened by a debate over whether or
not a conflict is genocidal. Interestingly, the debate on whether or not genocide was
being committed in Darfur also died down after the UN Commission of Inquiry’s
statement that it could not determine an overall genocidal policy but recommended
that the International Criminal Court (ICC) examine this and other questions of
individual accountability more closely. After the UN Security Council referred the
Darfur situation to the ICC in March 2005, almost all international actors adopted
language indicating that the exact determination was up to the Court.34 This changed
the dynamics from, in a way, voting on the question of whether genocide was being
committed to acknowledging that this question was best placed with a tribunal.
Another reason to use the term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ is that it, better than the existing
terms, captures what is actually happening to the people on the ground. Dictionaries
define ‘‘atrocity’’ as a brutal or barbarous act, and thus the term ‘‘atrocity’’ appears
immediately meaningful also to the non-expert and non-lawyer.35 It also is free of any
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tendency to avoid naming crimes such as rapes and killings as the crimes they are;
this remains more questionable with terms used by some governments with respect
to Darfur, such as ‘‘humanitarian disaster’’—which remind one of natural disasters
rather than accurately describing the reality on the ground in Darfur. ‘‘Genocide’’
is an artificial word; it is not self-explanatory and is understood very differently not
only among experts but, in particular, among non-experts and the general public.
Some view the Holocaust as the only genocide; others speak of the killing of animals
for food production as genocide. The same lack of clarity exists among the general
public about the term ‘‘crimes against humanity.’’ It is not clear to everybody why the
killing of some tribes in a hitherto unknown province of Sudan should be considered
a crime against humanity, thus also affecting citizens of Europe or North America.
On this notion of humanity and its universal membership, Michael Ignatieff once made
a poignant observation when reciting a scene from Claude Lanzmann’s film Shoah.
In this scene, a Polish peasant is asked what it meant for him that there was a
concentration camp bordering his fields. He answers, ‘‘When I cut my finger, I feel it.
When you cut your finger, you feel it.’’36 The term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ does not require us
to feel that we are part of some universal entity called ‘‘humanity’’; it does not require
that we all subscribe to some notion of liberal universalism. The term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
will not do away with all these issues, but it will add a sense of clarity.
To speak of genocide, some may interject, also sends a clear message. This may be
true in one way, but it also is important to note that labeling the situation in Darfur, or
any other situation, as ‘‘genocide’’ may be an oversimplification. Genocide is associated
with (and in some instances, such as the genocide definition of Frank Chalk and Kurt
Jonassohn, defined as) a form of one-sided killing.37 This is, of course, an accurate
description of the character of the crime of genocide and is important to remember.
Sometimes, however, genocide occurs against a background of armed conflict, and this
requires the observer to check carefully whether certain factions within the victim
group also commit crimes.38 To understand the current crisis in Darfur and to design a
solution to the underlying conflict, it is crucial to take note of the crimes committed by
some of the various and different Darfuri rebel groups.39 The term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
has the advantage of referring to human-rights violations in plural—leaving the door
open for a more nuanced picture of the conflict in question. When discussing the
deployment and mandate of a UN peacekeeping force, this may prove of crucial
importance.
In conclusion, Scheffer’s proposal is to be welcomed as a timely and needed
addition to the discourse on preventing and intervening in genocide. It will, of course,
take some time to make this term part of the common discourse in the media and
among decision makers, but genocide scholars and relevant non-governmental
organizations can influence this process.40 At one time ‘‘genocide,’’ too, was a
completely new creation; more recently, the concept of a ‘‘responsibility to protect’’
has made its way within a few years from a report commissioned by the Canadian
government into UN documents and diplomatic language. Genocide scholars should
begin disseminating the insight that ‘‘what matters is not the ‘‘G-word’’ but the
‘‘A-word’’—atrocity crimes.’’41
Looking Ahead: Genocide Prevention after Darfur
‘‘Just calling it genocide does not open a magic box—but it raises the moral and
political stakes. You can’t just say it’s genocide and then not get involved.’’42
This remark was made by Jerry Fowler, director of the Committee of Conscience
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at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, the day before the US government made its
genocide determination. Most people thought that way back in September 2004—and
were proven wrong. The conflict in Darfur has been labeled a genocide, and nothing
much has happened since.
For the reasons outlined above, Scheffer’s notion of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ constitutes
a chance to move on from the shock of the Darfur determination and the subsequent
lack of action for those working on genocide prevention. ‘‘New conceptions require new
terms,’’ Lemkin wrote when introducing his own concept of genocide, and that is what
‘‘atrocity crimes’’ does.43 The concept challenges genocide scholars to question their
existing focus on deciding whether or not a conflict is genocide, as it compels them to
revisit some of the existing truths about genocide prevention. Clearly, less energy
should be put into fighting and denouncing ‘‘deniers’’ of the ‘‘genocide’’ in Darfur and
elsewhere, when the main objective is to stop ongoing killings and to galvanize support
for an effective international response. A starting point for this work could be a closer
look at the mandate of UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Juan
Me´ndez:44 he is not to make genocide determinations. This is striking—and it makes
sense, not least because it gives the adviser a much broader mandate than to focus only
on actual cases of genocide.
In 2002, Samantha Power wrote on the value of the ‘‘G-word’’ that ‘‘still, Lemkin’s
coinage has done more good than harm.’’45 The question is whether this assessment
remains true after the tiring discussions regarding Darfur. In any case, it seems time
to limit the use of Lemkin’s concept of genocide to research and trials, while the
political work of prevention and intervention should make a fresh start—and it should
do so on the basis of the concept of ‘‘atrocity crimes,’’ as proposed by David Scheffer.
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